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The following story, from the Netherlands, would fit very well the general thesis 
Fraser defends in his remarkable book Law After Auschwitz: Towards a Jurisprudence 
of the Holocaust.1 In May 1941, a merchant bought a substantial quantity of pork 
meat without the necessary valid licence. This was a criminal offence according to 
the legal measures issued by the German occupation authority. Subsequently, the 
merchant was prosecuted and convicted by a special court for economic crimes 
established by the Germans. The merchant appealed his conviction and, in the last 
instance, the Dutch High Court had to decide whether his conviction would stand. 
The merchant’s legal complaint was that the establishment of the economic court 
was itself a violation of Article 43 of the International Hague Convention of 1907 
and that his conviction was thus void. Article 43 determines how an occupying 
force should deal with the existing law in an occupied territory. It declares clearly 
that it should respect existing legal institutions, “unless absolutely prevented.” The 
merchant argued that the occupier should have respected the existing statute on the 
organisation of the judiciary and the code of criminal procedural. The 
establishment of the economic court was not absolutely necessary, the merchant 
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534                                                                                               [Vol. 08  No. 05 G E R M A N  L A W  J O U R N A L  
contended; and thus the appeal amounted to a request for a review of the 
regulation in light of the higher law of Article 43 Hague Convention. This is exactly 
what the High Court did, but not with the result the merchant hoped for. The Hoge 
Raad held: 
 
(…), the promulgation of the Decree ( … ) 
concerning the trial of criminal cases affecting 
the economic life, published in the 
Verordnungsblatt for the occupied Netherlands 
territory (No. 71 of 1941), is to be considered a 
legislative measure of the occupying Power. In 
the prevailing circumstances such regulations 
cannot be denied the character of a wet (Act) in 
the sense of Dutch legislation (…) Neither the 
history nor the wording of Article 43 of the 
Regulations of 1907 afford any foundation for 
the assumption that the framers of the 
Convention intended to confer on the Courts, 
which had remained in function in an occupied 
territory in conformity with the purport of the 
said Article, jurisdiction to judge the measures 
taken by the occupant for the promotion of the 
interest therein set forth, in the light of the 
requirement that in doing so, the occupying 
Power is bound to respect the legislation in 
force in the country, unless absolutely 
prevented.2 
 
This ruling was the cause of immediate controversy, which persists in Dutch legal 
circles to this day.3 The reason is clear: the importance of the case does not reside in 
the fact that the conviction of this merchant was upheld, but that the decree of the 
German occupier was understood as “law.” The Dutch High Court made it 
absolutely clear how it understood the role of the judiciary vis-à-vis the German 
regulations and how it conceived of the hierarchy of legal norms. Obviously, the 
                                                          
2 Het ‘toetsingsarrest’, Hoge Raad [HR] [Supreme Court of the Netherlands], 1 December 1942, NJ 1942, 
271. 
3 See J. MICHIELSEN, THE “NAZIFICATION” AND “DENAZIFICATION” OF THE COURTS IN BELGIUM, 
LUXEMBURG AND THE NETHERLANDS Chapter 4 (2004); D. VENEMA, RECHTERS IN OORLOGSTIJD: DE 
CONFRONTATIE VAN DE NEDERLANDSE RECHTERLIJKE MACHT MET NATIONAAL-SOCIALISME EN BEZETTING 
Chapter 3 (2007) (for an overview). 
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Germans were satisfied with the outcome; in Dutch resistance circles, the decision 
was seen as a complete surrender, as a symbol of a subservient obedience to the 
occupying force. The decision that the German decree “cannot be denied the 
character of a wet’’ had implications for the other legal measures already taken by 
the Germans, including some ten anti-Jewish decrees issued before early 1942, as 
well as for those yet to be issued. They were (would be) “law” too. 
 
Immediately after the war, the German legal philosopher Gustav Radbruch tells us 
a completely different story in a couple of articles of which “Statutory Lawlessness 
and Supra-statutory Law” is the most famous.4 Here Radbruch argued that the 
most extreme measures taken by the German Nazis may have had the appearance 
of law, but that they either never actually acquired the status of “law” or should 
now be considered not valid. Radbruch’s postwar articles are also famous for the 
accusation that legal positivism induced lawyers to oversee this and that their 
formalism led to the moral collapse under the Nazi regime. In the mid-sixties, this 
position was revisited by Hart who rejected Radbruch’s stance and by Fuller, who 
basically accepted it. Addressing the issue of “transitional justice,” Radbruch comes 
up with the “formula” according to which statutory law has to yield when it clearly 
and intolerably violates precepts of morality.5 But Radbruch went even further: he 
argued that certain legal provisions, pursuant to which the National-Socialist Party 
claimed for itself the totality of the state and on which the inhuman treatment of 
certain “categories” of human beings was justified including violations of the 
proportionality principle in sentencing criminals, clearly betrayed the core value of 
justice, i.e. equality. Therefore these were clear examples of statutory lawlessness 
and had never attained the nature of “law.” The making of the law is, thus, 
intrinsically linked up with the notion of “equality” and not merely in a formal 
sense. A number of his post-war contemporaries followed Radbruch in this on the 
basis of the alleged unconstitutionality of the so-called “Enabling Act” of March 
1933. In sum, in 1946 Radbruch argued that the rise of the Nazi regime constituted a 
break with the legal past of the Weimar republic and he argued that it was now 
time to break with the Nazi regime and to restore the rule of law, after “twelve 
years of statutory lawlessness and of the denial of legal certainty.” 
                                                          
4 G. Radbruch, Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht, originally in: SÜDDEUTSCHE 
JURISTENZEITUNG 105-108 (1946); reprinted in G. RADBRUCH, DER MENSCH IM RECHT 111-124 (1957); and G. 
RADBRUCH, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 347-357 (E. Wolf ed., 7th ed., 1970); and G. RADBRUCH, GESAMTAUSGABE 
83-93 (A. Kaufmann ed., 1990).  There is a new German edition of the Rechtsphilosophie with editorial 
footnotes, edited by Stanley L. Paulson and Ralf Dreier, which includes this famous essay: G. RADBRUCH, 
RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE (STUDIENAUSGABE) 211-219 (1999).  Recently a new translation of this famous text 
appeared as G. Radbruch, Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and 
Stanley L. Paulson trans.), in 26 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 1-11 (2006). 
5 See R. ALEXY, THE ARGUMENT FROM INJUSTICE: A REPLY TO LEGAL POSITIVISM (Bonnie Litschewski 
Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson trans., 2002) for a contemporary defense of Radbruch’s approach. 
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Here we have two pointed examples of the fate of the “law” in relation to the Nazi 
regime and to Auschwitz. The example of the Dutch High Court fits very well with 
the central theme of Fraser’s fascinating book: there is no fundamental 
discontinuity between the law as it existed before the rise to power of the Nazis, the 
law in the Nazi-era in Germany and the occupied territories, and the law after the 
Nazi-era. It was law all the way through. In Fraser’s words, there was no shift from 
“law” to “not law” in 1933, nor did the defeat of Hitler in 1945 reinstitute a return 
to legality. There is in fact little which distinguishes our fundamental 
understandings and practices of law today from what German lawyers and judges 
did between 1933 and 1945. The widespread understanding of the Nazi state as a 
criminal regime, as radically discontinuous with that which preceded and 
succeeded the 1933-1945 period, is a “collective lie” that we tell ourselves in order 
to defend a clear line between good and evil.6 Thus, the way in which the 
Holocaust is nowadays remembered as something that is alien to the rule of law 
says more about the collectivity that remembers than it does about the historical 
events that took place. This is particularly true with regard to the key and essential 
elements of the legality of the Holocaust, which have been deliberately elided. The 
Holocaust,7 and the process leading up to the Holocaust, was - at the time – 
“perfectly lawful and legal.”8 It was not a lawless barbarism, but, on the contrary, a 
“lawful” barbarism,9 in which lawyers played an important part preparing, 
creating and perpetrating. This fact became obscured by constructions ex post, in 
which the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, discussed by Fraser in 
chapter 5, and lawyers like Radbruch played a significant role. 
 
The central thesis of the book, presented cogently in chapter 1, draws importantly 
on a peculiar understanding of “law” to which I will return later and is elaborated 
throughout the book. Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 6 focus primarily on the years before the 
Nazis came to power and on their use and abuse of the law during their reign, both 
in Germany and abroad, notably Vichy France.10 In making the claim that Nazi law 
was indeed “law,” Fraser importantly focuses on how others, outsiders, perceived 
                                                          
6 FRASER, supra note 1, at 44, 21. 
7 Fraser seems to use the concepts of Holocaust, Auschwitz and Shoah as interchangeable.  
8 See FRASER, supra note 1, at 5, 13, 15 for the proposition that Auschwitz was lawful. 
9 Id. at 48. 
10 Fraser has also published on the occupation of the Channel Islands and on Belgium.  See DAVID 
FRASER, THE JEWS OF THE CHANNEL ISLANDS AND THE RULE OF LAW: 1940-1945 (2000); David Fraser, The 
Fragility of Law: Anti-Jewish Decrees, Constitutional Patriotism and Collaboration in Belgium 1940-1944, 14 
LAW AND CRITIQUE 253-275 (2003).  
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the developments unfolding in Germany after 1933; whether or not certain state 
regulations are legal is to a large extent dependent on the outsider’s perspective. 
This, then, brings to light the fact that Anglo-American lawyers, in their discussions 
of Nazi legality, did not universally reject the German legal system after 1933 as 
being “non-law.”11 The idea of the Nazi state as an unlawful, illegitimate, criminal 
enterprise, operating outside Western understandings of law was not one which 
was dominant in the period between the Nazis’ ascent to power in 1933 and the 
time of entry of the United States into the war.12 For example, the infamous 1935 
Nuremberg legislation regarding citizenship sits less uncomfortably within the 
Western tradition of “equal citizenship” than is often assumed, particularly when 
compared with racial legislation in the United States and in other Western 
democracies that was still in force long after the demise of the Nuremberg laws.13 
Similar remarks on ideological and discursive continuity can be made with regard 
to eugenics and compulsory sterilization, accepted medical and social practice until 
recent times.14 
  
While these chapters primarily focus on the pre-Nazi-era – although they are never 
entirely historical in taking into account the way this era was perceived ex post – the 
remaining chapters focus primarily on the ex post perspective. Thus, how did “the 
Holocaust” make its way into the legal reality of the United States, Britain, Canada 
and Australia? After World War II, and with the Cold War well underway, many 
people were on the move, among them both victims and perpetrators of the Nazi 
horror. They sometimes ended up in each other’s vicinity, and sometimes the 
identity of the perpetrators was uncovered. The question then arose as to what to 
do. Here, Fraser gives detailed accounts - from an astounding variety of sources - of 
ways in which the American, British, Canadian and Australian legal systems tried 
to deal with these cases, while at the same time keeping “Auschwitz” at a safe 
distance.15 One of the guiding subtexts of these cases and trials, initiated often by 
requests from governments, notably the Soviet Union, now seen as the enemy in 
the Cold War, was how quickly the new narrative of the struggle against 
communism was able to replace the struggle against the evil of Nazism or at least 
                                                          
11 Perhaps, Fraser takes the relevance of this point too seriously; the outsider’s perspective is necessarily 
a sociological or positivist point of view.  See e.g. ALEXY, supra note 5.  
12 FRASER, supra note 1, at 79. 
13 Id. at 95. 
14 Id. at 425. 
15 Remarkably, Fraser does not discuss the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, in which--contrary to the 
Nuremberg trials (in which, as he writes, the Holocaust only played a “secondary role” )--this was 
absolutely central.  See id. at 130. 
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erase the memory thereof. Former collaborators of the Nazis were now portraying 
themselves, sometimes successfully, as freedom fighters. Fraser’s account stresses 
how, in these legal cases, it was absolutely essential to underline that the horrors of 
the Holocaust were (to remain) something “out there,” something that had nothing 
to do whatsoever with American law,16 or, for that reason, with the law of these 
other countries (it needed to be “a German phenomenon”17). These court cases and 
trials therefore never dealt exclusively with the individual perpetrators and their 
horrific acts but also with how to memorize the Holocaust. They were powerful 
instruments to keep at bay the “legality of the Holocaust” and the truth of the evil 
to which the law may lead. Adjudicating and constructing memory went hand in 
hand. This then brings Fraser to the following statements, namely that law and the 
rule of law may prove to be an inadequate forum for the complex issues of public 
memory and history which continue to surround the Holocaust,18 or even stronger, 
that “memory and justice can be and have been ill-served by law and 
jurisprudence,” to the extent that “memory can not be served within the legal 
system.”19 In other words, rather than doing justice to the victims, these trials 
added more to a distorted memory of the Holocaust as something discontinuous 
with our legal present.  
 
As Fraser focuses so much on “continuity” and sees any discussion of discontinuity 
as a construction ex post, invented and designed to prevent us from being tainted by 
the horrors of the Holocaust (and from acknowledging that we are), his 
understanding of the horrors must diverge from the usual conceptual framework 
into which the debates on the law of Nazi Germany have developed since 
Radbruch’s essay. Fraser is quite explicit that the “sterile debate”20 on the validity 
of the law cannot be of any help in understanding the problem of the legality of the 
Nazi-era: natural law and positivism do not advance the real issue.21 Rather, the 
debate on positivism itself was instrumental to inscribing the “law” of Auschwitz 
as non-law,22 and thus an element which contributed to the myth of discontinuity; 
the natural law view that Nazi law was law in form only (or a perverted form of 
                                                          
16 Id. at 251. 
17 Id. at 254, 341, 418. 
18 Id. at 293. 
19 Id. at 213. 
20 Id. at 28. 
21 Id. at 7. 
22 Id. at 12. 
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law in direct reference to Radbruch23) is epistemologically and historically 
unsound24 and rhetorical in nature only.25 To a certain extent, Fraser has a point 
here. In the Anglo-Saxon world, the discussion on the “legality” of Nazi Germany 
or the lack thereof took place primarily within the confines of the Hart/Fuller 
debate for a very long time. This meant that it could safely be isolated and that legal 
theory could restrict itself to the rule of law as something primarily “good.” It is 
clear indeed that Hart’s example of the grudge informer, which triggered the 
debate, is almost a mockery of what it is at stake. Elsewhere,26 I have argued that 
Hart grossly misunderstood this case by not acknowledging how it affected the 
Nazi judiciary. The grudge informer case, introduced by Radbruch in the above-
mentioned paper and discussed by Hart in relation to a case heard before the 
Bamberg Oberlandesgericht, was not about some ordinary German citizen who 
abused the Nazi law in order to get rid of a unwanted companion or husband, but 
about the way the Nazi judiciary was entangled and complicit in the way evil law 
was implemented and upheld. Although we might now not appreciate the way in 
which Radbruch tried to exonerate the judiciary from applying evil law, he did - at 
least partly - see the problem of how the Nazi-era was “full of law and lawyers.” 
Unlike Hart, Radbruch tried to address this problem, by stressing the need to 
restructure German law and to incorporate the development that had begun with 
the human rights declarations and by stressing the need “to rebuild the Rechtsstaat, 
a government of law that serves as well as possible the ideas of both justice and 
legal certainty.”  
 
As long, however, as the debate on the validity of Nazi law - between natural law 
and positivism - was concerned with minor problems of ordinary citizens taking 
advantage of discriminatory laws to solve their private problems, and not with the 
ways in which law itself was implicated in bringing evil about, Fraser is right to be 
sceptical about this debate. As a result, his book does not use the ordinary 
parameters in which the debate is normally set: a discussion of the validity of the 
law; of the relation between validity and obedience; of whether the law consists of 
rules only or of moral principles as well; of whether a natural connection between 
law and morality exists, etc. Indeed, some of the usual array of authors that 
                                                          
23 Id. at 142. 
24 Id. at 77. 
25 Id. at 145. 
26 Thomas Mertens, Radbruch and Hart on the Grudge Informer: A Reconsideration, 15 RATIO JURIS 186-205 
(2002). 
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dominate this agenda are only briefly mentioned: Kelsen and Schmitt; Radburch, 
Hart and Fuller; and Dworkin, Raz and Alexy.27 Where this monograph is also 
meant to be an essay on the nature of “law,” on what Auschwitz tells us about it, it 
urges us to look elsewhere, at post-modern authors, such as Lyotard, Derrida and 
Agamben. According to Fraser, they should be seen as our most prominent and 
promising guides. 
 
Without doubt, Fraser’s book is both important and provocatively challenging. It 
needs to be read and reread. Yet, it sometimes overstates the point it wishes to 
make, and not to its advantage. This is true on a rather trivial level, as when Fraser 
discusses the issue of how the extradition cases of supposed former perpetrators in 
Western countries like the United States came to be about the lies they told about 
their past when applying for citizenship or residence and not about the substance 
of their crimes. He then concludes from this, for example, that the Holocaust is not 
an American problem but that only lying about it to come to the United States is.28 
Yet the lying and the killing are obviously connected; revealing to immigration 
officers that one was a Nazi perpetrator would have significantly reduced the 
chance of being admitted to either the U.S. or Canada. Clearly this exaggeration 
and others result from the moral outrage resulting from Fraser’s conclusion - 
justifiably - that so little has been done to bring to justice the perpetrators of the 
Nazi horror, and that anti-Semitism still played an important role in these and 
similar post war cases. The emphasis on discontinuity is important here too: they 
were the Nazis, not we; we are lawyers and democrats.  
 
Overstating the case affects Fraser’s book on a more fundamental level too, i.e., in 
relation to legal continuity itself. As far as I see it, the thesis of continuity is 
substantiated by a couple of interconnected statements. First, and this is 
emphasised by others as well,29 strong links in terms of personnel exist between the 
periods mentioned: most German lawyers who worked under the Weimar republic 
stayed in place when the Nazis took over, and then also remained at their post after 
1945 when the German Federal Republic was created. Legal community is 
apparently very malleable and this is not only true for Germany, as the Vichy case 
proves.30 Secondly, law and lawyers were essential for implementing anti-Semitic 
racism, by legally defining who were to be excluded from the body politic, by 
                                                          
27 FRASER, supra note 1, at 23. 
28 See id. at 235; or, in relation to Canada at 349: “… he was forced to leave Canada not because he killed 
Jews but because he lied about killing Jews.” 
29 See, e.g., I. MÜLLER, FURCHTBARE JURISTEN, DIE UNBEWÄLTIGTE VERGANGENHEIT UNSERER JUSTIZ (1989). 
30 FRASER, supra note 1, at 27. 
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legally robbing them of their property, by legally isolating them from the rest of the 
population and by thus preparing the legalised killing. In one word, law and 
lawyers were essential in creating a category of persons that could be exterminated 
but not murdered,31 in defining them as “homo sacer.” Auschwitz was only 
possible because of “law,” and therefore it was a lawful place.32 Thirdly, lawyers 
like Loesener, the Jewish expert in the Ministry of the Interior33 did not stop 
perceiving of themselves as lawyers when they implemented legal regulations 
concerning the Jewish question, nor did outsiders, most certainly until the outbreak 
of the war, look upon those regulations as in any way deviating from the “law.” 
Fourthly, the idea of discontinuity was a construction ex post, as a rhetorical device 
to shield ourselves from being implicated in the horrors of Auschwitz.  
 
Yet, these assertions are not unequivocally true. Many lawyers and judges did 
remain in place after the Nazi takeover, yet, at the same time, many others were 
ousted as a consequence of the early and important legal measure concerning the 
purification of the civil service taken by the Nazi authorities, Radbruch being one of 
them.34 This measure resulted in a brain drain, not only in the natural sciences but 
also in the fields of philosophy and law.35 In the eyes of those who remained and 
were to become the legal backbone of the Nazi regime, the Nazi takeover was not 
just the result of yet another “ordinary and lawful”36 application of Article 48 of the 
Weimar Constitution. For many contemporaries, the events in early 1933 and the 
Hitler regime were - contrary to what Fraser writes37 - remarkable indeed and 
many of them saw Hitler’s rise to power as a constitutional break with the past. The 
“Enabling Act,” which gave the Hitler government legislative power, was seen as a 
provisional Constitution for the new Germany.38 Fraser, in his attempt to 
                                                          
31 Id. at 16. 
32 Id. at 55. 
33 Id. at 36. 
34 This was possible because of the notorious "Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums“ of 
April 7, 1933. 
35 R. Zimmerman, Was Heimat hiess, nun heisst es Hoelle, in JURISTS UPROOTED. GERMAN SPEAKING ÉMIGRÉ 
LAWYERS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY BRITAIN 1-71 (J. Beatson, R. Zimmerman eds., 2004). 
36 FRASER, supra note 1, at 144. 
37 Id. at 24. 
38 This was the perspective chosen, for example, by C. Schmitt, in: STAAT, BEWEGUNG, VOLK 7 (1933); if 
on the other hand, the Enabling Act derived its legitimacy from the Weimar Constitution, as Fraser 
seems to say, then the constraints of that constitution should have remained valid too. But as is well 
known, the civil rights which could not be restricted under Article 48 were as easily put aside as other 
constitutional devises of “Weimar”. So the continuity thesis is doubtful here either way. 
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emphasize continuity, has to downplay the very living sentiments in early 1933 that 
Germany was being reborn, either for better or for worse. Secondly, while it is 
undoubtedly true that law played a key role in defining, robbing and isolating the 
Jews, there is much less evidence that the actual mass killing of the Jews was 
governed by law too. Pogány makes a similar point when he writes in his review 
that no laws prescribed the genocide of Europe’s Jews.39 This brings me to the third 
and more general point that Fraser leaves rather underdeveloped. Ever since Franz 
Neumann’s Behemoth and Fraenkel’s thesis of the Dual State a vivid discussion 
exists as to whether the Nazi state could be called “legal” in any sensible meaning 
of the word.40 While it is true that many of the legal participants were indeed still 
acting as lawyers in 1933, just like they did before, they had lost quite a few of their 
former colleagues and they were serving a leader who did not value “law” very 
highly.41 Something similar might be said with regard to 1945, seen by many, most 
prominently by Radbruch and by Kelsen, as a moment of radical rupture after the 
defeat of the German forces which brought to an end the “legal” mechanisms of the 
Nazi state in what was called Stunde Null (zero hour). Obviously, there are 
continuities between the Nazi regime and the later Federal Republic - in this regard 
the name of Globke is worth mentioning - and it is rewarding to emphasize that the 
rupture was not complete, but Fraser’s statement that there is a deep continuity 
despite all these legal transformations is simply an overstatement. The idea of 
discontinuity is not only a construction ex post to which the Nuremberg Trials and 
authors such as Radbruch made such important contributions.  
 
How then can Fraser save his “continuity” thesis when confronted with such 
powerful counter-arguments, making it almost evident that “discontinuity” is not 
merely ex post and that there were also deep ruptures? In order to understand this, I 
have had to delve deeper into Fraser’s use of the concept of law itself. To me, it 
seems that Fraser is only able to uphold the continuity thesis at the price of 
providing us, on the one hand, with a very formal conception of “law” and, on the 
other hand, with a very substantial, maybe even “metaphysical” one. Neither of 
these is particularly appealing to me. According to the former view, “law” is 
merely a tool42 and little more than the persuasive deployment of rhetorical devises 
                                                          
39 I. Pogány, 6 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 428 (2006) (reviewing DAVID FRASER, LAW AFTER AUSCHWITZ 
(2005); See also R.O. PAXTON, THE ANATOMY OF FASCISM 163 (2004), “. . . .outside the reach of the German 
normative state and of German law.”  
40 See, e.g., R.O. PAXTON, THE ANATOMY OF FASCISM 119 (2004) (for an overview).  Paxton distinguishes 
between the normative and the prerogative state.  See also MUELLER, supra note 29, at 294.  
41 H. WEINKAUFF, DIE DEUTSCHE JUSTIZ UND DER NATIONALSOZIALISMUS: EIN UEBERBLICK 46-56 (1968).  
42 FRASER, supra note 1, at 319. 
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and signifiers.43 Whether there is “law” entirely depends on the self-understanding 
of the defined professional groups such as lawyers, judges and other participants in 
the interpretative community. In other words, the question as to whether the Nazi 
era contained “law” entirely depends on whether there were sufficient Nazi 
lawyers, judges and other legal participants understanding themselves as acting 
within a legal system.44 Certainly, something can be said in favor of defining “law” 
in such a nominalistic way. “Law” refers to the community that uses it and accepts 
it as such; this forms the basis of any positivistic theory that grounds the validity of 
the law in the formal acceptance - by its officials, as Hart would say, of its ultimate 
rule. But there is a considerable downside to this too. If “law” is everything and 
everywhere as soon as its prominent interpreters say it is, the reverse seems to be 
true as well: as soon as important interpreters decide that something is “not law,” 
or that it constitutes a rupture with the rule of law, why would this not be true 
also? Why not accept with Radbruch and with the International Military Tribunal 
that Nazi law was not “really” law, or only a “perverted” form of law? And what 
does it mean when Fraser argues time and again that Auschwitz is full of law? That 
decisions were made at the ramp, that the life in the camp was structured around 
some kind of rules, with its inevitable yet unpredictable exceptions, and that its 
inmates were being ordered, even to their own deaths? Does the predicate “law” 
still have a distinguishing quality if “law” merely indicates human behavior as it 
always is somehow “rule governed”? Understanding the world, including 
Auschwitz, as full of law, means understanding it as being full with competing, 
mutually incompatible systems of rules and norms, some legal and some not, in 
which choices have to be made. This is the position from which a natural law 
perspective inevitably begins; it searches for a criterion on the basis of which more 
preferable systems of norms can be separated from the less preferable ones. Despite 
the epistemological difficulties attached to any natural law perspective, its 
approach - often couched in terms of searching for the connection between law and 
justice - seems inescapable to me.  
 
This, however, is not the direction in which we have to search for Fraser’s 
“metaphysical” conception, according to which “law” has its own substance. He 
argues that the concepts of law and justice should not be confused. Or even 
stronger: choosing law is never the same as choosing justice.45 What, then, is this 
substantial concept of “Law” – indeed often indicated with a capital “L”?46 Here, 
                                                          
43 Id. at 8. 
44 Id. at 28, 21. 
45 Id. at 77, 212. 
46 See, e.g.,  id at 13, 15, 55. 
544                                                                                               [Vol. 08  No. 05 G E R M A N  L A W  J O U R N A L  
“Law” is - almost - presented as an acting “subject” itself, which cannot judge the 
Holocaust,47 which forgets and forgives itself,48 which had to be saved when 
confronted with an insurmountable difficulty,49 which continued when six million 
died and will always end up triumphant,50 which owes a duty to the victims, yet 
must betray itself and is able to do so as it is a flexible instrument,51 which should 
but cannot judge itself and its role in the Holocaust.52 
 
Earlier, I remarked that Fraser’s account of what happened before, during, and after 
the Nazi-era is not a distanced historical account, but that it is written with moral 
outrage. This outrage not only concerns the Nazi perpetrators or the lawyers who 
were ever present to make the horrors of Auschwitz possible; it not only 
encompasses the contemporary by-standers, both German and foreign who saw 
how law was used for evil purposes. The moral outrage not only concerns the easy 
acceptance of anti-Semitism both in Germany and aboard, both then and now (as 
became apparent during the post-war extradition procedures Fraser discusses). 
Despite his explicit denial that “law is inherently evil,”53 his outrage, so it seems to 
me, concerns “Law” itself. The thesis of discontinuity was developed, Fraser 
repeatedly states, to save the “Law” from the damning verdict that it was so 
prominently present at Auschwitz. These efforts have been successful: the law is 
saved together with “the rule of law,” and the truth of Auschwitz is hidden and 
conceived as something else, as an “Other,” as unrelated to us and our “law.” But 
what good, so Fraser continues, did discontinuity bring? The reestablishment of the 
law and its discontinuity from Auschwitz meant that no justice could be done to 
the victims; that hardly any serious recollection exists of the evil options entailed by 
living under the law or that the condition of law is a very precarious and risky one. 
  
That the “Law” itself is one of the main perpetrators of Auschwitz is the pessimistic 
message I derive from this fascinating book: under law everything including 
genocide is possible and therefore the gap between law and justice is simply 
unbridgeable. While Auschwitz and law can be brought together, even easily it 
                                                          
47 Id. at 8. 
48 Id. at 10. 
49 Id. at 12-13. 
50 Id. at 145, 213. 
51 Id. at 198, 277, 298. 
52 Id. at 324. 
53 Id. at 21. 
2007]                                                                                                                                     545 David Fraser’s Law After Auschwitz 
seems, this is not the case with justice. Justice and “law” are incompatible, of a 
qualitatively different species. “Justice” would simply burst the categories of “law”; 
and “law” is unable to bring justice. Failing to acknowledge the evil of “law” does 
not so much result from a reluctance to glance in the mirror,54 but from the sheer 
impossibility of doing so. As for now, I am not ready to accept this as the message 
Auschwitz teaches us. 
 
Let me return to the Netherlands, as the record of the law during the German 
occupation is not as bleak as suggested by the example with which I began this 
review. In early 1943, a criminal case arose before the Leeuwarden Court of 
Appeals. The case itself was uninteresting. The Court had little doubt that the 
earlier conviction by the District Court could stand legal scrutiny; even the criminal 
sentence was adequate, i.e. proportionate to the crime committed. There was not 
really any serious ground for the appeal. Yet, the Court of Appeals did something 
interesting in reducing the sentence imposed. In its short but telling opinion, it 
stated that it wanted to prevent the offender from serving his term of imprisonment 
under the harsh conditions of a newly established prison camp named “Erika,” 
which was run by Dutch Nazis and Germans. The Leeuwarden Court argued that it 
could not impose the original sentence, albeit that it deemed it proportionate, as the 
imposition of such a sentence would violate “the legal provisions and the intent of 
Lawgiver and Judge.” Confirming the earlier sentence would run counter to “the 
moral conscience of this court.”55 
 
Despite the many detailed accounts of how people fared before, during, and after 
the Nazi-era under law, Fraser uses a quite homogeneous conception of the law, 
either in its “tool” conception or in its substantial “perpetrator” conception. 
However, the Leeuwarden Court of Appeals case suggests that the law is the result 
of a choice between several sets of often conflicting norms all claiming to represent 
“valid law.” In this battle between competing norms, judges and citizens and their 
representatives in legislative bodies have to decide as to what the law should be. In 
the Leeuwarden case, the judges took the legal claims of their conscience more 
seriously than the “law” of the occupier; Radbruch attributed the “statutory 
lawlessness” primarily to the refusal of the judiciary to acknowledge the claims of 
justice. Conceptualizing “law” not as homogeneous entity, but rather as the result 
of an ever temporary balance between conflicting claims of sets of norms striving 
                                                          
54 M. Stolleis, Prologue: Reluctance to Glance in the Mirror: The Changing Face of German Jurisprudence after 
1933 and post-1945, in DARKER LEGACIES OF LAW IN EUROPE 1-18 (C. Joerges, N.S. Galeigh eds., 2003).  
55 Hof Leeuwarden 25 February 1943, NJ 1951, 643.  
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for supremacy suggests that seeking homogeneity rather than the “Law” itself 
results in moral catastrophes such as Auschwitz.56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
56 V. Grosswald Curran, Formalism and Anti-Formalism in French and German Judicial Methodology, in 
DARKER LEGACIES OF LAW IN EUROPE 207, 225 (C. Joerges, N.S. Galeigh eds., 2003). 
